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OKLAHOMA
By: Mark D. Christiansen1
I. ROYALTY OWNER LITIGATION
A. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms Decision of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma Certifying
a Modified Royalty Owner Class
In Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC,2 the plaintiff
royalty owners (collectively, Naylor Farms) contended that Chaparral
systematically underpaid royalties on production from approximately
2,500 Oklahoma oil and gas wells by improperly deducting from
royalty payments certain costs that the plaintiffs contended should
have been borne solely by Chaparral under Oklahoma law. The
district court granted Naylor Farms’ motion seeking certification of a
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I3.13
1. Mark D. Christiansen is an energy and resources lawyer with the Oklahoma
City litigation firm of Edinger Leonard & Blakley PLLC.
2. 923 F.3d 779, 784 (10th Cir. 2019).
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class of royalty owners under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.3 In the present proceedings, Chaparral has appealed the
district court’s order granting class certification.4
Naylor Farms brought this suit alleging “claims for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, and
failure to produce in paying quantities.”5 Naylor Farms asserted that
Chaparral breached what was described by the court as the “implied
duty of marketability (“IDM”)”6 by improperly deducting what were
described as “GCDTP-service costs”7 from the royalty payments
Chaparral made to Naylor Farms and other similarly-situated royalty
owners. More specifically, certain midstream companies acquired
title to or possession of the gas and natural gas liquids (“NGLs”) at or
near the wellhead, and then performed certain GCDTP services and
sold the treated gas to downstream purchasers. In turn, the midstream
companies deducted from the gross proceeds the amount they received
from the downstream sales of production, i.e., the costs and fees
associated with performing the GCDTP services. They paid Chaparral
the resulting net proceeds. Chaparral then computed royalty payments
“based on the net proceeds it receives from the midstream companies,
rather than . . . based on the gross proceeds the midstream companies
receive from the downstream sales.”8 Naylor Farms asserted that this
approach to calculating royalty payments “requires royalty owners to
bear the costs of transforming unprocessed gas into a marketable
product” in breach of the IDM.9
3. Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, No. CIV-11-0634-HE 2017,
WL 18754, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2017) (“[P]laintiffs’ motion for class
certification [Doc. #134], with the stated modifications, is granted. Plaintiffs’ fraud
claim will be excluded and the class will be limited to include those leases with
“Mittelstaedt Clauses” listed on plaintiffs’ Exhibit 29.”) By later proceedings, the
class definition was further revised to specify June 1, 2006, as the commencement
date of the class period. Naylor Farms filed its Amended Class Definition (including
the incorporation of the revisions referred to in the district court’s Order of January
17, 2017) with the clerk of the district court. See Doc. 175, filed April 17, 2017, and
Doc. 176, filed April 18, 2017.
4. Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 783.
5. Id.
6. Id. (“The IDM imposes upon lessees ‘a duty to provide a marketable product
available to market.’”) citing Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203,
1206 (Okla. 1998).
7. Id. (explaining that “GCDTP services” refers to the “gathering, compressing,
dehydrating, transporting, and producing” of raw or unprocessed gas.)
8. Id. at 784.
9. Id.
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Naylor Farms moved the court to certify a class of similarly
situated royalty owners.10 In opposition to that request, Chaparral
argued that a determination of whether it breached the IDM would
require an assessment of “individual issues, including the obligation
created by each” individual oil and gas lease “and the gas produced
from each” individual well,11 as well as individual questions as to
damages. Chaparral urged that those issues would predominate over
any common questions. The district court disagreed and found that
class certification was appropriate, except that it excluded Naylor
Farms’ fraud claim from the class certification order.12
Chaparral appealed. It asserted three primary arguments in
support of its effort to obtain a reversal of the class certification order.
First, Chaparral contended that marketability constitutes an individual
question that predominates over any common questions. Second, it
argued that distinctions in lease language also give rise to individual
questions that likewise predominate in this case. Finally, Chaparral
contended that there is a lack of evidence showing that it employs a
uniform payment methodology to support certification. The Tenth
Circuit proceeded to address “whether the district court abused its
discretion in concluding that Naylor Farms satisfied Rule 23’s
certification requirements.”13
The court first addressed the issue of marketability. The Tenth
Circuit stated that “[i]t has been more than two decades since the
Oklahoma Supreme Court (“OSC”) has said anything meaningful
about marketability,”14 citing Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc,
supra. However, finding that Mittelstaedt did not provide guidance
on the specific marketability questions presented in this appeal, the
court stated that its “task is ‘to predict how [the OSC] would rule’ if it
were to answer those questions.”15 The court then reviewed the
principles and reasoning applied by the OSC in Mittelstaedt, and in
the more recent Oklahoma Court of Appeals decisions in Whisenant
v. Strat Land Expl. Co.16 and Pummill v. Hancock Expl. LLC.17
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
429 P.3d 703 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018).
419 P.3d 1268 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018).
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Chaparral contended that the district court erred in ruling “that
(1) the question of when the gas became marketable can be answered
via generalized, classwide proof and (2) as a result, the marketability
question doesn’t defeat predominance.”18 Chaparral additionally
argued that the district court erred in treating marketability as a
question of law, rather than as a question of fact. It asserted that a
determination of the marketability question and whether Chaparral
breached the IDM requires a “well-by-well analysis to determine
whether any of the gas at issue was marketable at the wellhead.”19
Thus, the marketability question would defeat commonality and
predominance.
However, the Tenth Circuit found that “the district court’s
ruling that marketability is subject to class-wide proof under the
specific facts of this case is entirely consistent with the [Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals’] decision in Pummill.”20 With regard to
Chaparral’s reliance on the Whisenant decision, the court noted
Chaparral’s insistence that “marketability can never be susceptible to
classwide proof because it will always require an individualized
assessment of the gas produced by each well.”21 However, the court
emphasized the Whisenant’s finding that certain factual issues were
not susceptible to generalized proof according to reference to that
particular case. “[T]he Whisenant court recognized that the OSC has
declined to adopt a uniform test for determining when gas becomes
marketable [and instead] left the issue open to resolution on a case-bycase basis.”22 The court left open the possibility that, in some cases, a
determination might be made as to “when gas became marketable
without undertaking an individualized inquiry into the quality of that
gas.”23
The court then found that “the facts in Pummill (and, by
extension, the facts in this [Chaparral] case) fit comfortably in the
space ‘left . . . open’ by Whisenant.”24 In light of the court’s reading
of Pummill and Whisenant, the Tenth Circuit predicted that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court would hold:
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 791.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id.
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Under the facts of this case, a jury could determine
when the gas at issue became marketable without
individually assessing the quality of that gas; instead, a
jury could make this determination based solely on the
expert testimony that all the gas at issue was required
to undergo at least one GCDTP service before it could
“reach” and be “sold into” the pipeline market.25
The district court in Chaparral was found to have not abused
its discretion by concluding that the question of marketability “in this
particular case is subject to common, classwide proof for purposes of
satisfying Rule 23’s commonality and predominance requirements.”26
The court next turned to Chaparral’s contention that
distinctions in oil and gas lease language present individual questions
that predominated over any common questions. The district court
below rejected that argument and found that “its decision to limit the
class to leases containing a Mittelstaedt Clause renders such an
individualized analysis unnecessary.”27 Most of the Tenth Circuit’s
discussion addressing this particular area of the appellants’ arguments
focuses on which issues were presented and preserved below. The
Tenth Circuit was not persuaded that the district court abused its
discretion in certifying the class despite the existence of what the court
characterized as minor variations in oil and gas lease language.
Finally, on appeal, Chaparral urged that “Naylor Farms failed
to demonstrate that Chaparral uses a uniform payment methodology
to calculate royalty payments,”28 and that such failure warranted the
denial of class certification. However, while the existence of a
uniform payment methodology, alone, was found by the court to be
insufficient to meet the predominance requirement, the court rejected
the notion that such a methodology is a necessary component for
satisfying predominance. Moreover, the court noted that “[t]he fact
that damages may have to be ascertained on an individual basis is not,
standing alone, sufficient to defeat class certification.”29 Naylor
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 781.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 798 (citing Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 922 (10th Cir.

306

TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L.

[Vol. 6

Farms presented evidence that individualized evidence will not be
needed because its expert can determine damages on a class wide basis
through the use of a model. The Tenth Circuit further noted that the
district court could also, if needed, divide the class into subclasses for
purposes of determining damages.30 The district court was found to
have not abused its discretion in concluding that individual questions
about damages do not defeat predominance.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s order granting Naylor Farms’ motion for class certification
subject to certain modifications of the class definition consistent with
its opinion.
B. Oklahoma Court of Appeals Reverses Certification of Class of
Royalty Owners
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Whisenant v. Strat Land
Exploration Co.,31 reversed a decision of the District Court of Beaver
County certifying a royalty owner class. Whisenant sued Strat Land
alleging, on behalf of a proposed class of similarly situated royalty
owners, the underpayment or non-payment of royalties on natural gas
and its constituents from certain Oklahoma wells. The evidence
showed that the putative class included approximately eighty-eight
Oklahoma wells and approximately 1,000 royalty owners throughout
the United States (¶ 15, note 11). The proposed class wells were
located within, or adjacent to, Ellis, Harper, Beaver, and Texas
Counties.32
Whisenant asserted that one of the issues of law and fact
common to the proposed class was “whether gas [is] in Marketable
Condition at the meter run/gathering line inlet.”33 He additionally
argued, among other issues, that Strat Land paid royalties to him and
to the proposed class using a common method based on the net
revenue Strat Land received under its marketing contracts rather than

2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 143 (2018)).
30. Id. at 790.
31. 429 P.3d 703, 704 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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paying royalties based on the gross amount received by the midstream
purchaser from its sale of the gas at interstate or intrastate markets.34
The district court certified a class, subject to a series of exclusions not
described below, consisting of all royalty owners in Oklahoma wells
that:
(a) [were] operated by [Strat Land]; (b) marketed by
Strat Land to DCP Midstream (f/k/a Duke Energy Field
Services)’ and (c) that have produced gas and/or gas
constituents (such as residue gas, natural gas liquids,
helium, or condensate) from February 12, 2009 to the
time Class Notice is given.35
The district court granted class certification under 12 O.S. §
2023(B)(3). Strat Land filed an interlocutory appeal of the class
certification order.36
The court of appeals observed that the primary issue on appeal
is whether there are common questions of law or fact. However, since
the class was certified below under 12 O.S. § 2023(B)(3), the court
noted the additional requirement that common issues predominate
over other questions. Early in its discussion, the court stated that “[i]n
the present case, class certification is inappropriate because a ‘highly
individualized’ review of the facts pertaining to each of the numerous
wells is necessary.”37 In concluding that the lower court’s order
granting class certification should be reversed, some of the key
findings of the court of appeals included the following:
First, the court found that the standards in Oklahoma for
determining whether certain types of post-production costs may be
deducted in the computation of gas royalty payments, as recognized in
the landmark case of Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,38 require
a fact-intensive inquiry. That the trial court found “that Strat Land had
34. Id. at 705.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 705–06 (Under Oklahoma state court procedure, an order granting or
denying class certification is “subject to a de novo standard of review by any
appellate court reviewing the order.” citing 12 O.S. Supp. 2014 § 2023(C)(2)).
37. Id. at 707 (The Oklahoma Court of Appeals cited in support of this
conclusion its earlier decision in Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 405 P.3d 131 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2017), cert. denied).
38. Id.
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a common corporate policy of not paying royalty on the gross value of
the gas produced under the leases”39 was insufficient to satisfy the
predominance requirement of 12 O.S. § 2023(B)(3).40 Rather, in
discussing the complex analysis of determining whether the costs
deducted in the computation of gas royalties were expenses necessary
to make the gas a marketable product, the court of appeals stated that
“highly individualized and fact-intensive review of each Class
Members’ claim would be necessary to determine if [the defendant]
underpaid oil or gas royalties.”41
Second, as a consequence of the above, the court of appeals
rejected Whisenant’s contention that “[c]lass action treatment will
allow a large number of similarly situated individuals to prosecute
their common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently,
and without duplication of time, expense and effort on the part of those
individuals, witnesses, the courts and/or [Strat Land].”42 The court was
likewise unpersuaded by Whisenant’s contention that disposing of the
case as a class action would “avoid the possibility of inconsistent
and/or varying results in this matter arising out of the same facts.”43
Third, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals declined Whisenant’s
assertion that “determination of the quality of gas and other facts
pertinent to each well are susceptible to generalized proof.”44
Fourth, the appellate court rejected the use of assumptions
parallel to those used in the case of Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,45
finding:
[A]n assumption analogous to that forwarded by the
employees in Tyson—i.e., an assumption that, for each
gas well within the proposed class, the royalty-

39. Id.
40. Id. at 708 (The court of appeals cited EQT Production Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d
347, 366 (4th Cir. 2014) quoting “Even a plethora of identical practices will not
satisfy the predominance requirement if the defendants’; common conduct has little
bearing on the central issue in the litigation – in this case, whether the defendants
underpaid royalties.”).
41. Id. at 709 (citing Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 405 P.3d 131 (Okla. Civ. App.
2017), and Foster v. Apache Corp., 285 F.R.D. 632, 638 (W.D. Okla. 2012)).
42. Id. at 710.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016).
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valuation point and deductible costs can be set at the
same average point and amount — is unwarranted. 46
The court concluded that a class-wide determination based
either on the variables as they existed with Whisenant’s one well “or
on an average sampling (i.e., of gas quality, proximity of interstate
pipelines, availability and proximity of processing plants, market
realities, and so forth) would result in distorted and inconsistent
awards to the various members of the class.”47 Citing Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Marez,48 the court noted that “a judgment must be based upon
evidence that establishes essential facts as probably, not merely
possibly being true.”49
Fifth, the court of appeals found “[a] reliance upon facts
derived from other wells would be as impermissible as it would have
been to determine liability in Wal-Mart based upon generalized
evidence derived from other store managers.”50 The court of appeals
rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that class action certification was
appropriate here based on their contention that the case would rely on
admissible expert testimony to prove class-wide liability.
Finally, the court held that, even if Strat Land paid royalties to
the members of the putative class using a common method, “the
establishment of this common fact fails to resolve the issue of liability,
an issue which remains individual rather than common.”51 The court
specifically rejected Whisenant’s contention that the alleged common
method was either right or wrong, class-wide.
Concluding that the predominance and superiority requirements
for class certification under 12 O.S. § 2023(B)(3) were not satisfied in
this case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting
class certification. Whisenant’s subsequent petition for certiorari
review by the OSC was denied by order issued on October 1, 2018.
Mandate was issued on October 31, 2018.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Whisenant, 429 P.3d at 710–11.
Id. at 711.
931 P.2d 760 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
Whisenant, 429 P.3d at 711.
Id.at 712.
Id.
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II. OIL AND GAS LEASE CANCELLATION, TERMINATION AND BREACH
OF OBLIGATION CASES (OTHER THAN ROYALTY)
A. Court of Appeals Affirms the District Court’s Finding that the
Term Assignments at Issue in this Case Required the Commencement
of the Well Within the Primary Term or any Extension Thereof, but
did Not Require Completion of the Well within the Primary Term.
In the case of Blue Dolphin Energy, LLC v. Devon Energy
Production Company, LP,52 the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s
order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant
Devon. This appeal was assigned to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals’
accelerated docket under OSC Rule 1.36, and the case was considered
based on the briefs filed with the district court, without appellate
briefing.
The plaintiffs had entered into a Term Assignment of Oil and
Gas Leases with Felix Energy, LLC (Devon’s predecessor) in April
2014. In January of 2016, Felix merged with Devon, and Devon
assumed the interests covered by the assignments. The Blue Dolphin
plaintiffs alleged that the assignment:
contained a “primary term of three (3) years,
commencing on the first day of the calendar month that
immediately follows the Effective Date, which was
April 30, 2014.” Plaintiffs [Blue Dolphin] state in the
petition that the Assignments “required the assignee to
complete a well capable of producing in paying
quantities prior to May 1, 2017, which is the expiration
of the primary term.” [Blue Dolphin plaintiffs]
contend that because Defendant failed to complete the
well by May 1, 2017, the primary term in the lease
“expired and the secondary term never commenced.”53
The plaintiffs asserted that the leasehold interests covered by
the subject assignment reverted back to the Blue Dolphin plaintiffs
because Devon did not complete any wells by the end of the May 1,
52. Case No. 117,134 (Okla. Civ. App. May 30, 2019) (Not for Publication);
Court Issue, 90 Okla. B.J. 707, 779–80 (Vol. 12) (June 22, 2019)
53. Blue Dolphin Energy, No. 117,134 at 2–3.
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2017 primary term. They further alleged that Devon trespassed and
interfered with the plaintiffs’ right of exclusive possession of the
property underlying the assignments of leases “by remaining on the
property, continuing to conduct operations thereon, and extracting oil
and gas from the property without Plaintiffs’ authorization.”54 Finally,
the plaintiffs argued that Devon continuously converted plaintiffs’
crude oil and natural gas produced after the May 1, 2017 termination
of the assignment of leases.
The Blue Dolphin plaintiffs moved for partial summary
judgment in their favor, contending that: (a) the letter agreement and
term assignments in favor of Felix, now Devon, unambiguously
required completion of a well by May 1, 2017; (b) Devon did not
complete a well by May 1, 2017; and (c) without a completed well by
May 1, 2017, the term assignments expired and reverted to the
plaintiffs.
Defendant Devon filed a combined: (a) response in opposition
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment; and (b) cross-motion
for partial summary judgment in favor of Devon. It asserted, among
other allegations, that the assignments were extended because Devon
was engaged in drilling or completion operations as of May 1, 2017.
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted the
defendant Devon’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The
Blue Dolphin plaintiffs appealed.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals first examined certain
detailed provisions of the Term Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases and
the related Letter Agreement of April 16, 2014 to assess whether those
terms were ambiguous:
“The mere fact the parties disagree or press for a
different construction does not make an agreement
ambiguous.” Id. ¶ 14. “A contract is ambiguous if it is
reasonably susceptible to at least two different
constructions.” Id.55
The court recited a series of additional rules of construction.

54. Id. at 3–4.
55. Id. at 9.
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Blue Dolphin contended that the assignments required that
Devon complete a well by May 1, 2017, in order to avoid the
expiration of the assignments. Blue Dolphin further asserted that the
language of the documents allowed Devon to continue to hold the
lands so long as Devon commenced drilling or reworking operations
within ninety days of the completion of the prior well as either a
commercial producer or a dry hole.
However, Devon argued that since it was engaged in
operations relating to its well through May 1, 2017 and those
operations were ongoing through the completion of the well as a
commercial producer in July of 2017, the primary term of the Term
Assignment was extended through the completion.
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the trial
court found that the primary term of the assignment extended past May
1, 2017, for the purpose of allowing Devon to complete its ongoing
well operations. The court quieted title in favor of Devon. Blue
Dolphin appealed.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that
the assignments only required the commencement of the well within
the primary term or any extension thereof, and the diligent
continuation of drilling operations through the completion of the well
as a commercial producer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Devon and held
that the primary term of the lease was extended under the language of
the term assignment to allow Devon to continue ongoing drilling
operations through to their completion.
III. OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS, TRANSACTIONS AND TITLE MATTERS
A. Court Addresses Lawsuit by Private Business Group to Obtain a
Copy of Public Real Estate Records from the County Clerks for Use
in the Group’s Business of Selling Rights of Access of its Copies of
the Records
The case of TexasFile, LLC v. Boevers56 presented Texas
File’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary
judgment and that court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of
56. 437 P.3d 211 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018).
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the defendant County Clerks of Kingfisher County and Garvin
County.
TexasFile is in the business of providing (via internet) remote
access images of county land records to its subscribers. TexasFile, at
the time of these proceedings, did business in Texas, New Mexico,
and a few counties in Oklahoma. It had contracts with county officials
in Blaine, Logan, Oklahoma, and Grady Counties, Oklahoma, under
which it received digital land records for its business, and subscribers
were allowed to access the images of the public land records.
On May 6, 2016, TexasFile submitted a request to the County
Clerk of Kingfisher County, pursuant to the Oklahoma Open Records
Act, for a “complete electronic copy of all the Kingfisher County land
records that are currently available in electronic format.” The court
noted that TexasFile did not request the associated tract index. The
communication specifically requested all records that were currently
available on OKcountyrecords.com. The County Clerk did not
respond to that request. TexasFile made a second request for an
electronic copy of the land records on January 11, 2017.
On May 15, 2017, the County Clerk of Kingfisher County
responded and denied Texas File’s request, as described in more detail
in paragraph five of the court’s opinion.
TexasFile commenced the present declaratory judgment and
mandamus action against the County Clerk of Kingfisher County
“asking the trial court to enter an order determining TexasLink was
entitled to an electronic copy of the Kingfisher County public land
records maintained by the County Clerk, pursuant to the Oklahoma
Open Records Act, and compelling the County Clerk of Kingfisher
County to make available the land records of the Kingfisher County
Clerk’s office in an electronic format at a reasonable fee.”57
The Kingfisher County and Garvin County Clerks joined in a
Motion to Consolidate the present case with the separate lawsuit
TexasFile had instituted on the same issues with regard to Garvin
County. The district court treated that motion as a Motion to Intervene
and granted intervention to the Garvin County Clerk.58
TexasFile filed a prompt Motion for Summary Judgment and
Brief in Support that set out in detail the facts and law that TexasFile
57. Id. at 212–13.
58. Id. at 213.
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urged in support of its contention that the requests it had made of the
County Clerk were valid and should be honored. It contended that the
case cited by the Kingfisher County Clerk, County Records, Inc. v.
Armstrong, was inapplicable to this appeal. TexasFile asserted that
the Armstrong case was distinguishable because it involved a request
for the tract index, which was and is prohibited by statute. In contrast,
TexasFile did not request a copy of the tract index. Additionally, the
Armstrong court relied on the Abstractors Act, which is not involved
in the present action.59
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he issue
presented on appeal is whether a county clerk is required to provide
an entity with an electronic copy of the county land records maintained
by the county clerk when the copies will be used for commercial
purposes.”60
After proceeding through a detailed review of the issues and
pertinent authorities, including the Armstrong case and the Open
Records Act (which we will not attempt to fully outline in this case
summary), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in
denying TexasFile’s request for the county land records of the two
County Clerks in this case. It affirmed the granting of summary
judgment in favor of the County Clerks of Kingfisher and Garvin
Counties. The Court of Appeals also rejected TexasFile’s assertion
that the district court erred in allowing the County Clerk of Garvin
County to intervene in this case. It found that the intervention at issue
here met the requirements of Oklahoma’s intervention statute and
served the interest of judicial economy.
IV. SURFACE USE, SURFACE DAMAGES, OKLAHOMA SURFACE
DAMAGES ACT, CONDEMNATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
A. Interpretation of the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act as Applying
to One Who Owns a Current Possessory Interest in the Surface

59. Id.
60. Id. at 214.
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The case of Hobson v. Cimarex Energy Co.61 presented the
question of “whether a vested remainderman is a surface owner under
the [Oklahoma] Surface Damages Act.”62
The OSC held that a vested remainderman is not a “surface
owner” under the Act. Rather, for purposes of the Surface Damages
Act (“SDA”), the term “surface owner” refers to one who holds a
current possessory interest.63
The father in this case held a present “life estate” in the surface
rights of the subject property in Canadian County, Oklahoma. The son
held a “vested remainder interest” in the surface rights. Before drilling
the subject well, the oil and gas lessee (“Cimarex”) reached an
agreement with the life tenant regarding surface damages under the
SDA. After the well was drilled, Cimarex paid the life tenant in
accordance with the agreement. The son (remainderman) sued
Cimarex claiming that Cimarex should have negotiated with him as
well under the SDA, and he was entitled to compensation under the
Act. In response, Cimarex contended that a future interest owner does
not qualify as a surface owner under the SDA. Cimarex asserted, in
the alternative, that a “future interest owner does qualify as a surface
owner and his cause of action is against the life tenant.”64
The trial court held that a vested remainderman does not
qualify as a surface owner under the SDA and dismissed the action
with prejudice. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
disagreed and found that the SDA focuses on ownership rather than
possession. It reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted Cimarex’s petition for writ of
certiorari.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court observed at the outset of its
opinion that the present appeal “concerns the interpretation of ‘surface
owner’ under the SDA.”65 It noted that “[t]he SDA defines ‘surface
owner’ as ‘the owner or owners of record of the surface of the property
on which the drilling operation is to occur.’”66 The court went on to

61. No. 116,721, 2019 WL 4438043 (Okla. Sept. 17, 2019).
62. Id. at *1. See Surface Damages Act (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. 52
§ 318.2 (2010)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. 52 § 318.2(2) (2010)).
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make certain additional key findings and rulings in reaching its
decision:
1.The SDA’s definition of surface owner was found by the
court to be ambiguous.67
2.The court observed that a vested remainder interest (which
the son owned in this case) becomes possessory only when the
preceding estate (here, the father’s life estate) comes naturally to its
end. “The lessee of a mineral lease is statutorily required to negotiate
with the person or persons holding a current possessory interest in the
surface of the land.”68 The court noted that, in this case, the son would
not hold a possessory interest until his father’s life estate came to a
natural end.
3.The court observed that “[i]interpreting surface owner as
requiring current possessory interest gives effect to legislative intent
and promotes justice.”69 [Emphasis added] To require a possessory
interest “does not modify the rights of the life tenants and vested
remaindermen. A life estate entering a new minerals lease must still
seek the remainderman’s consent because removal of minerals will
certainly affect the corpus of the property. [Citation omitted]
Additionally, if the life tenant’s transactions with the mineral
leaseholder constitute an unreasonable injury to the remainderman’s
estate, the remainderman may bring a waste claim. [Citation omitted]
A remainderman maintains recourse for the definite removal of corpus
and potential waste from all other actions by the life tenant.”70
4.The court concluded by recognizing, again, that the SDA’s
definition of “surface owner” was ambiguous.71 “This Court is
persuaded by the common meaning, expressed legislative intent, and
interests of justice that the SDA’s use of surface owner applies only
to those holding a current possessory interest. Under the SDA, a
mineral lessee must negotiate surface damages with those who hold a
current possessory interest in the property. A vested remainderman
does not hold a current possessory interest until the life estate has
come to its nature end.”

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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5.The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the decision of the
Court of Appeals and affirmed the order of the trial court.
Note: Four (4) Justices concurred in the opinion, and a Fifth
justice concurred specially. Four (4) justices dissented and three of
those joined in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Darby.
B. Tenth Circuit Affirms the Lower Court’s Dismissal of the
Proposed Class Action Lawsuit by Homeowners for Alleged
Increases in the Cost of Insurance Due to Earthquake Issues
In Meier v. Chesapeake Operating L.L.C.,72 the plaintiff
“homeowners brought a class-action lawsuit against operators of
wastewater disposal wells for hydraulic fracturing operations, alleging
the injection wells were significantly increasing seismic activity
across larger portions of Oklahoma. The only damages the
homeowners sought were the increased costs of obtaining and
maintaining earthquake insurance.”73
More specifically, the
homeowners sought to recover “ ‘[t]he value of premiums paid to
obtain earthquake insurance coverage; and/or . . . [t]he excess amount
required to maintain earthquake insurance coverage after 2009,’ as
well as punitive damages.”74 The lawsuit was filed in the District
Court of Payne County, Oklahoma. However, the defendants removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma under the Class Action Fairness Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
The named defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on
the homeowners’ alleged lack of standing and failure to state a claim.
The federal district court held that (a) the homeowners did have
standing to sue, (b) but it dismissed their suit for failure to state a
claim. The court predicted that “the Oklahoma Supreme Court, if
confronted with the issue, would find the relief requested by plaintiffs
not legally cognizable under the circumstances present in the case at
bar.”75 After its review of case law from Oklahoma and other states,
the court found no authority to support an award of insurance
premiums under the circumstances presented.
The plaintiff
homeowners appealed.
72.
73.
74.
75.

778 F. App’x 561, 563 (10th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564.
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The Tenth Circuit initially addressed the homeowners’ motion
to certify stated questions in this appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. Citing prior Tenth Circuit authority regarding certification of
questions to the highest state court, 76 the court observed as follows:
While we apply judgment and restraint before
certifying . . . we will nonetheless employ the device
[certification of questions to the state courts] in
circumstances where the question before us (1) may be
determinative of the case at hand and (2) is sufficiently
novel that we fell uncomfortable attempting to decide
it without further guidance.77
The Tenth Circuit declined the request that it certify the
question to the OSC. First, the court found that it was highly unlikely,
given the state of the legal authority, that the OSC would find in favor
of the homeowners. It cited prior commentary to the effect that
questions ought not to be certified if the answer is reasonably clear.
Additionally, the court found it to be significant that the homeowners
never requested certification of the question until the district court
ruled against them on the merits. It found that the fact that a party
only raises certification of the question after an adverse district court
ruling “weighs heavily against certification.”78 Citing those two
primary reasons, the Tenth Circuit declined to certify the question and,
instead, proceeded to consider the merits of the question of “whether,
under Oklahoma law, a homeowner can sue for increased insurance
premiums absent any actual damage to property.”79
The appellate court found that, while no Oklahoma authority
specifically addressed the question at issue, “other states have
consistently failed to recognize a cause of action for increased
insurance premiums based on a tortfeasor’s negligence.”80 The Tenth
Circuit concluded that it was “highly unlikely the Oklahoma Supreme

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. (quoting Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007)).
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 566.
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Court would allow proportional recovery for unmaterialized risk here,
given its refusal to extend the loss-of-a-chance doctrine elsewhere.”81
The Tenth Circuit engaged in further analysis of additional
case law and concluded that, “[b]ecause the homeowners pleaded no
legally cognizable claim for relief, the district court properly
dismissed their complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).” The court declined
to certify the question to the OSC and affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the lawsuit.
C. Tenth Circuit Affirms District Court’s Exclusion of Two Expert
Witnesses for the Plaintiff and Summary Judgment Ruling in Favor
of Defendants
The plaintiff in Hall v. Conoco Inc.82 lived near the defendants’
(ConocoPhillips) Oklahoma refinery as a child. “Roughly two
decades later, Ms. Hall developed a form of leukemia,” which was
alleged to have resulted from her early exposure to the refinery’s
emissions of benzene.83 Hall sued ConocoPhillips for negligence,
negligence per se, and strict liability.84 In her effort to prove the
alleged link between the refinery’s emissions and her development of
leukemia, Hall proposed to present three expert witnesses at trial. The
district court granted ConocoPhillips’ motion to exclude the expert
testimony of two of the proposed experts (i.e., Dr. Gore and Dr.
Calvey). The court also granted summary judgment to ConocoPhillips
finding that, in the absence of the testimony of the excluded witnesses,
Hall had not presented sufficient evidence linking her disease to
benzene exposure.85 Hall appealed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its review of the
issues by reviewing the primary standards applicable to the exclusion
of expert testimony. The court further observed that expert testimony
must be determined to be reliable before the district court can admit
the testimony. “The district court’s assessment of reliability is review
for an abuse of discretion,”86 which includes an assessment of whether
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 567.
886 F.3d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1311.
Id.
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the reasoning and methodology is both scientifically valid and
applicable to a particular set of facts.
The appellate court reviewed and summarized the pertinent
facts below in detail and concluded that Dr. Gore’s proposed
testimony could be justifiably regarded by the district court as
unreliable “because of his failure to (1) justify ruling in benzene, or
(2) rule out idiopathic87 causes.”88 The Tenth Circuit found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Gore’s
opinion. With respect to Dr. Calvey, the court noted that her testimony
“was excluded in part because Dr. Calvey had not ‘adequately
address[ed] the issue of exposure.’”89 Hall did not challenge that
rationale, which the Tenth Circuit found “[foreclosed] reversal of the
exclusion of Dr. Calvey’s testimony.”90
Turning to the summary judgment ruling in favor of the
defendants, Hall argued that circumstantial evidence (e.g., “the
presence of hydrocarbon leaks and odors in her neighborhood,
groundwater contamination, a high benzene reading near her residence
. . .”91) was sufficient to defeat summary judgment. However, the
Tenth Circuit found that the circumstantial evidence did not “create a
genuine issue of material fact on causation because of the need for
expert testimony on the link between her disease and benzene
exposure and quantification of Mr. Hall’s exposure to benzene.”92
Without the testimony of Dr. Gore and Dr. Calvey, Hall could not meet
her burden on the foregoing causation issues. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of
ConocoPhillips.
V. TRIBAL AND INDIAN LAND MATTERS
A. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms District Court’s Finding
of Trespass by Pipeline Owner Who Continued to Operate Pipeline
After Expiration of its Limited Term Easement, but Reversed the
87. Dr. Gore and other experts described an “idiopathic” disease as a disease in
which the cause is unknown. Id. at footnote 1.
88. Id. at 1316.
89. Id., citing Hall v. Conoco Phillips, 248 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1193 (W.D. Okla.
2017).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.at 1317.
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Permanent Injunction Below Based Upon the Standard Applied in
Granting the Injunction
The dispute presented in Davilla v. Enable Midstream
Partners L.P.93 arose in connection with the expiration of a twentyyear pipeline easement that covered certain Native American Indian
allotted lands in Oklahoma. Enable Intrastate Transmission, LLC
owned and operated a natural gas pipeline that traversed the lands.
After the easement expired, Enable did not remove the pipeline, but
rather continued to operate it. Enable ultimately approached certain
allottees and sought a new twenty-year easement. It also applied to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) for approval of a new easement.
However, Enable failed to obtain approval for the proposed new
easement from the allottees of a majority of the equitable interests in
the land as required by applicable regulations.
As a result, the BIA cancelled Enable’s right-of-way
application. As Enable continued to operate the pipeline, a large group
of individuals who held certain rights in the subject lands (the
Allottees) filed suit in federal court alleging that Enable was
trespassing on their land. They asked the court to enter an injunction
compelling Enable to remove its pipeline. The parties were able to
stipulate to most of the relevant facts. The Allottees moved for
summary judgment on the issues of liability for trespass and injunctive
relief. The court granted the Allottees’ motion and requests for relief.
Enable appealed.
Enable asserted two primary arguments on appeal. First, it
argued that “the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of the Allottees on their trespass claims.”94 Second, Enable
asserted that “the district court erred in issuing a permanent injunction
to enforce the summary judgment ruling.”95
In addressing the issues raised on appeal, the Tenth Circuit
noted at the outset that “it is the law, not the material facts, that
complicates this case.”96 The court further recognized that “[b]ecause
we lack a federal body of trespass law to protect the Allottees’ federal
property interests, we must borrow state law to the extent it comports
93.
94.
95.
96.

913 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 964.
Id. at 964–65.
Id. (Emphasis added by the court).
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with federal policy.”97 The court went on to observe that “[t]he State
of Oklahoma recognizes a right of action in trespass where one person
‘actual[ly] physical[ly] inva[des] . . . the real estate of another without
the permission of the person lawfully entitled to possession.’”98 The
Tenth Circuit concluded as follows:
Our reading of Oklahoma law thus yields three
elements constituting the Allottees’ federal trespass
claims. First, the Allottees must prove an entitlement
to possession of the allotment. Second, they must
prove Enable physically entered or remained on the
allotment. Finally, they must prove Enable lacked a
legal right—express or implied—to enter or remain.
The stipulated facts already described definitively
prove the first two elements.99
However, Enable took issue with the entry of summary
judgment on the third element of the trespass claim. Enable contended
that it had produced evidence of consent sufficient to prove a legal
right to maintain the pipeline on the subject lands despite the
expiration of the easement. More specifically, Enable showed that, in
2004, it had “obtained written consent forms from five of the thirtyseven individual Allottees in this case,”100 showing that the five were
willing to grant a new right-of-way for the pipeline in exchange for
cash consideration.
While the Tenth Circuit noted that “evidence of a plaintiff’s
consent to a defendant’s entry on the land will defeat liability in cases
where the plaintiff’s consent itself creates a right to enter or
remain,”101 it found that such evidence would not be sufficient in the
present context.
When it comes to maintaining a pipeline over Indian
allotted land, however, Congress has dictated the
prerequisites of a right to enter by statute. Enable thus
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 967.
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has no legal right to keep a structure on the Allottees’
land unless and until it secures a right-of-way for that
purpose from the Secretary of the Interior. See 25
U.S.C. § 323. The Secretary must, in turn, have the
approval of the relevant Indian stakeholders.102
The court found that the authorities cited by Enable fell short
of holding “that one cotenant has no right of action for trespass under
Oklahoma law when another cotenant—much less a small minority of
co-tenancy interests—has agreed to a right-of-way easement.”103
Moreover, the court observed that, even if Oklahoma law were to
provide that such evidence could defeat a trespass claim, “federal
courts should only incorporate state rules of decision into federal
claims to the extent those rules are consistent with federal law and
policy.”104 The court concluded that Enable’s view of the law would
“frustrate federal Indian land policy, effectively robbing Indian
allottees and the government of meaningful control over
alienation.”105 Enable lacked a legal right to keep the pipeline in the
ground.
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the second key argument of
Enable with regard to the trespass claim—i.e., that, even if the
easement had expired, no duty to remove the pipeline ever arose
because the Allottees never demanded that Enable remove it.
Recognizing, again, that Oklahoma law would be incorporated into the
subject federal claim so long as it did not frustrate federal policy, the
court found that Oklahoma case law does not create a requirement that
prior demand be made.106 Rather, citing provisions of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, “the easement’s expiration created a duty to remove
the pipeline. . . Indeed, there would have been no sense in limiting the
easement term to twenty years otherwise.”107
The court concluded that “Enable acquired the pipeline
already knowing the right-of-way would eventually expire. It
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 967–68.
106. Id. at 969.
107. Id. The court did, however, discuss the easement holder’s potential right to
re-enter the property after the expiration of the easement for the purpose of removing
the pipeline. Id. at 969–70.
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therefore cannot—and indeed does not—claim it lacked notice of its
duty to remove or intent to maintain the trespass.”108
Finally, the Tenth Circuit reviewed Enable’s challenge to the
permanent injunction issued by the district court requiring Enable to
remove the pipeline. As to this third basis for the appeal, the court
agreed with Enable. The court recognized that a district court abuses
its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of
law. Here, “the district court relied primarily on Oklahoma law—with
supplemental authority from other federal courts—to conclude that
‘equity will restrain [a continuing] trespass.’ [citations omitted] As a
result, it did not apply the usual four-factor test guiding federal courts’
grant of permanent injunctive relief.”109
The court found that, in determining whether to apply
Oklahoma law or federal law in determining the standards for a
permanent injunction, the court should consider:
(1) “whether application of state law would frustrate
specific” federal interests, (2) whether there is a “need
for a nationally uniform body of law,” and (3) other
considerations such as whether “application of a
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships
predicated on state law.”110
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred because the
circumstances in the present lawsuit indicated a distinct need for
nationwide legal standards. “This uniform standard is necessary
because the Secretary has undoubtedly approved easements over and
across Indian land in multiple states.”111 The court noted that similar
circumstances as those in the present dispute could lead other
easement holders to be subject to an order of removal upon expiration
of their easements. If the court did not apply a uniform standard in
determining those issues, “an easement holder in Oklahoma and one
in Kansas could be subject to differing permanent injunction standards

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 970.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 972.
Id.
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despite both receiving an easement from the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to the same federal program.”112
By failing to apply the federal courts’ traditional equity
jurisprudence to its remedy analysis, the [district court]
committed an error of law and thus abused its equitable
discretion.
Accordingly, we must reverse the
injunction order and remand for a full weighing of the
equities.113
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Allottees. It
reversed the entry of the permanent injunction, and remanded the case
for further proceedings.
B. United States Supreme Court Defers Decision to Allow for
Additional Briefing and Oral Arguments in Pending Challenge to
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision on Whether Congress Ever
“Disestablished” the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation
In a decision issued August 8, 2017, in the appeal of the
defendant’s conviction for an alleged brutal crime, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reached findings and conclusions that are of
substantial concern to both the Oklahoma energy industry and the
business community generally.114 Murphy, a member of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation asserted in this appeal that he was wrongly
prosecuted and convicted in the Oklahoma state courts for a crime that
occurred in Indian Country (as defined in 18 U.S.C. §1151) over
which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The state district
court rejected Murphy’s argument, finding that the crime had occurred
on state land.
In a 126-page opinion addressing the issues on appeal, the
Tenth Circuit found that, under the principles of Solem v. Bartlett,115
Congress never disestablished the Creek Reservation. The case was

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 971.
Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2017).
465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
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remanded to the state district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus
vacating Murphy’s conviction and sentence.
Royal filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court on February 6, 2018. The Petition was granted by the
Court on May 21, 2018. Multiple amicus curiae briefs were filed. The
parties and certain of the amicus participants presented oral argument
to the Supreme Court on November 27, 2018.
On December 4, 2018, the Supreme Court directed the parties,
the Solicitor General, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation to file
supplemental briefs addressing two questions:
(1) Whether any statute grants the state of Oklahoma
jurisdiction over the prosecution of crimes committed
by Indians in the area within the 1866 territorial
boundaries of the Creek Nation, irrespective of the
area’s reservation status. (2) Whether there are
circumstances in which land qualifies as an Indian
reservation but nonetheless does not meet the
definition of Indian country as set forth in 18 U. S. C.
§1151(a).116
The supplemental briefs were filed in late December 2018 and
in January 2019. On June 27, 2019, the appeal in Murphy was restored
to the calendar for re-argument but without specifying a particular
date. As of the date this report was prepared, no specific date appeared
to have been set for the presentation of the anticipated further oral
arguments before the Court.
As a final note for those who are only lightly watching for
further developments in this case, the case appears to be destined to
experience at least three name changes during the several years it has
pended on appeal. At the time the Tenth Circuit proceedings were
filed and through the date the Tenth Circuit issued its decision, the
case was entitled Murphy v. Royal.117 Mr. Terry Royal was, at that
time, the Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. When initial
oral arguments were presented to the United States Supreme Court in
116. Order for Supplemental Briefing, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626
(2018)
(No.
17-1107)
https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/17-01107qp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZCZ-3W9X].
117. Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164.
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the Fall of 2018, the case was entitled Carpenter v. Murphy,118 because
Mr. Mike Carpenter had assumed the role of Interim Warden of the
Oklahoma State Penitentiary. By letter dated July 25, 2019, counsel
for the Petitioner notified the Clerk for the United States Supreme
Court that Mr. Tommy Sharp now serves as the Interim Warden of the
Oklahoma State Penitentiary and will be automatically substituted as
the Petitioner in this appeal in future proceedings.
VI. OTHER ENERGY INDUSTRY CASES
A. Carried Working Interest Owner Sues to Recover its Claimed
Share of Production Proceeds Under the Production Revenue
Standards Act
The court in Abraham v. Palm Operating, LLC,119 was
presented with a suit by Abraham alleging violations of Oklahoma’s
Production Revenue Standards Act, conversion, and restitution.
Specifically, Abraham (a carried working interest owner in an oil and
gas lease covering the Elias Kerns No. 2 well) sued the well operator
(Palm) and the first purchaser (Pacer) for his alleged share of the
proceeds from the sale of production. Abraham also sued the
defendants for interest on the unpaid proceeds based on the alleged
violation of the Production Revenue Standards Act (“PRSA”),120
actual and punitive damages for conversion, and for restitution. The
first purchaser, Pacer, denied liability and asserted, as affirmative
defenses, the expiration of applicable statutes of limitation, laches, and
waiver. Pacer further alleged that Abraham lacked clear marketable
title, and that any failure by Pacer to make payment was due to
Abraham’s negligence or lack of diligence, as well as error by the
operator Palm or prior operators.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Abraham for $22,859.52 in production proceeds plus 12% interest,
costs, and attorney fees. The purchaser, Pacer, appealed.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals noted at the outset of its
decision, in footnote 2, that the parties disputed whether Abraham’s
118. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (2018) (No.
17-1107).
119. 447 P.3d 486, 487 (Okla. Civ. App. 2019).
120. Id.
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ownership121 interest was properly characterized as a “carried working
interest” (notwithstanding the fact that the assignment in Abraham’s
favor stated that it was assigning a carried working interest).
However, the court stated that the “type of ownership interest
Abraham has is not material to this dispute.”122
As for the primary issue presented in the appeal, the court
found that one of the most important facts on appeal was that the
parties agreed that at Palm’s (the operator’s) direction, the purchaser
(Pacer) paid to Palm the working interest proceeds for the production
the purchaser took from the well. Pacer asserted that it had no liability
for the production proceeds after it paid them to the producing
owner/operator Palm, pursuant to 52 O.S. 2011, §570.10(C)(1). The
court further noted that the evidentiary materials before the court
showed that Palm was the producing owner under the PRSA.
Abraham additionally argued that Section 570.10(C)(1) did
not apply to this case “because, according to Abraham, while Palm
may have been the producing owner of some of the production, it was
not the producing owner of the portion of the production attributable
to Abraham’s interest.”123 Rather, Abraham was the owner of that
production. After discussing the operation of the PRSA provisions in
further detail, the Court of Appeals concluded:
The evidentiary materials in the record show that
Abraham was not the operator or producing owner and
that Palm was the operator and producing owner.
Abraham has not disputed Pacer’s assertion that it paid
the proceeds of production to Palm and therefore,
under §570.10(C)(1), Pacer has discharged its liability
for payment of proceeds of production. Pacer was
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all
of Abraham’s claims against Pacer.124
Finally, in apparent indication as to the reason why Abraham
pursued recovery against the purchaser of production with greater
effort than the operator, the court advises in footnote 3 of its opinion
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 488 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id.
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that, before this case was filed, Palm’s assets had been placed in
receivership in an action filed by a bank in another county, and Palm’s
predecessor in title had sought bankruptcy protection. Abraham
asserted that he dismissed his claims against Palm. In contrast, Pacer
contended that Abraham’s claims against Palm were simply stayed.125

125. Id. at 488 n.3.

